Introduction
At the opening plenary of the l6'l'Conference of the Parties (COP l6) to the UN Framework Convention on Clirnate Change UNFCCC) the Japanese Delegate indicated "Japan will not inscribe its target under the Kyoto Protocol on any conditions or under any circumstances." (Vidal 2010) , In these and later commerrts the Japanese or"rtlined a preference fbr the Coperrhagen Accord which allows countries to set volLrntziry/ ancl rron-binding reduction targets. Japan's position, which tool< many by sLrrprise and rvas later fbllowed by Russia, likely ended the UN's attempt to constrLrct a birrding rnulti-lateral agreement on global emissions targets. Last minute negotiations establishing a'green climate furrd'for mitigation and technology transfer, albeit with fLrnd sources unknown, appear a concessior-r to countries at risk and to the LIN's role as the manager of tl-re global environmental governance GEG) framework. In Janr-rary of 2011 This paper argues that the environrnental discourse has been fundamentally transfonled in tlie period since tlre 1960s and 1970s when environntental issues enrerged as a global colcerlt. Whereas at that tirne, environmeutal concerns oliett focutsed on tlie tteed for human restrailt vis-d-vis the environnrent, lhe idea of "sustainable development" outlined within Otn, Contmon Fttture (WCED,1987) sLrbsumes tl-ie idea of the environtnent vvithin the context of man's aspiration for economic development. This represents a signilicant change in the position or standingaccorded the natural environmelit which, throughout tlie 18tl'and much of the 19tl'century, stood alien,'other'and inclifferent so helped tnanl<ind define itself'
As'other'the natural environment was to be approached and governed according to some criteria that bridged, ancl in bridging so acknowledged, the gap-exploitation, conservation, preservation (Hays, 1959; 1982 Blijhdom's (2007,201l) argument for the politics of unsustairrability is reviewed ivith the goal of shorving horv the s/unding of nature might offer insights thereabout.
Standing and Voice
Standing, has a specific meaning in legal doctrine that gives it rich connotatiorrs. In United States law s'tcrnding defirres the doctrine that answers the qLrestiou: "u,ho may sLIe betbre the federal court." The simplicity of the qLrestion belies its complexity generally and with respect to environmentai law (Higley, 1992 Hirschrrran (1970; 1976) who Lrsed it to characterize a particular form of human agency in the context of orgarrizational membership. He described yoice as "any attenrpt at all to change, rather than escape frorn, an objectionable state of ai'fairs, rvhether throLrgii individLral or collective petition to the managenteut directly in charge, throLrgh appeal to a higl-rer ar"rthority with the intention of tbrcirrg a change in managerner-rt, or through various types of actions and protests including those that are meant to mobilize pLrblic opinion" (Flirschman, 1970: 30) , Sr-rbsequently the idea has been applied extensively to corporate governance and stal<eholder theory and thror,rgh both, on to environmentalisn'i.
Assrrmed inltoice and articulated irr the legal application of s'lctncling, is the common idea of a clain-i made toward, and reciprocal obligation recognized by an 'other' that derives fronr a presumption, right, or context governing the relationship. 1'he context/r'ight/etc may be legal, norrnative, or affective but it is recognized by both parties-whether concurred or contested-as the source of the 'rllles of the game' that fiarrie the relationship. For most of' human l-ristory the natural environment-proximal, alien and indifferent-has beer, the context within which tnan stood. The l 8'h century begins transforrning the dyadic relationship of man and nature througli the application of science and industr')'. Nineteenth century indr-rstrialism and the urban capitalism it creates puslred natttre f'arther bacl< allowing the social relations that define modernity as a culture of production and consumption. Late 19tl'century romanticism emerged to remind mankind that along r,vith his liberation fi'om the cruelties of nature came a distance from nature that obviates its role to stand opposite man in the still larger context of life itself as sr-rblime and ineffable. AlthoLrgli rlan's relationshilt rvitlr natlre changed over titne, tlatLll'e itself contilrues to exist as alien, other, and possessed of its orvn .slctnding. Matt's relationship rvith nature is describecl in polarities that witness jLrst this difference: "eco-centric" atld "tecltllo-centric," "t:io-centric" and "anthropocentric," or "Arcadiau" aud "Protlethean" (Pal<,201l; Pepper, 1996; Robinson,2004) . Ttre first of the poles reflects nature as primar5,, olten untouched, providing a space within u,hich man lives and, in the romantic extreme, from whence he may access the sublime. The second focuses upon natLlre's materiality and r-rtility for man. Robinson's (2004) analysis of the fbnns of environmental actiott also demonstrates this binary distinction. Orientation toward environmentalism as personal "value change" that derives from the former positions reflects a demand for man to reformulate his standing in relationship to nature. The call for the "technical fix" as policy driven utilitarian approach to the more efficier-rt utilization of resources for man's needs reflects the second term.
From Standing to Subordination in Sustainable Develollmcnt
The 1970s represented the lieight of concern lor and clebate about economic grotvlh, the values inherent there, and the ueed to change indiviclLral behavior rvithin that context. Tire 1972, Liruits to Groyvtft (Meadows et al., 1972) (Mebratu, 1998; Sach,1993; Robinson, 2004) (Lele, 1991) and its contradictions (Daly, 1991; Redcliff, 1981; provol<irrg a crusade for redefinition that largely degenerated from "logical coherencetothatofsenrantics" (Mebratu, 1998: 518) .More inrportantthanthefirtileatterrr;rt at imputing meaning to term intended as "constrLlctive arrbiguity" (Robinson; is recognizing what sustainable development is not. Absent in the 200 plurs pages of Our Finger, 1993) . This context left no roonl for considering restraitrt but only for defining clevelopmer-rt and forthis the environment must be subordinated. Said Sachs (1993: The end of the Cold War begins the emergence of neui actors demanding recogrtition in a world no longer constrainecl or restrained by the bi-lateral order of the "long-peace" (Caddis, 1986; Waltz, 1993) . The collapse of bilateralism created a social atrd economic vacuum for rvftich there were no rules and into which resurged local iclentitl, previottsl),sLrbordiriated within the poiver blocl<s. Two fbrces charactelize this envirorll-net1t: "One involves all those forces that press for centraliz-ation, integration, and gtobalizalion, and the other consist of those fbrces that press for decentralization, fragrnentation atrcl localization" (Rosenau,2005: 24). New technologies encouraged facilitated a globalizing economy while new global problems-crime, terrorism-followed that required more cross border government cooperation between agencies, which in its horizontal linkages, threaten to fragment the state's hierarchical government structure (Slaughter, 1997) . What emerged was, in Rosenau and Czienrpiel's (1992) (Rosenau, 2005) are most often accornpanied by sLrggestions to fixthe institutions (Esty,2009; Parl< et aI.,2009 (Donaldson & Preston, 1995 (2000) argLre the natural ertvirottmetlt cannot elicit an obligation 1'r'onr rrarragelrent because it cannot t,c.tice a claim.
Later, Phillips and Freeman (2003) review tl.re literatr,rre, reaftlrrn that position and conclude, along with Orts and StrLrdler (2002:215) that the theory is "limited by its focus on the interests of human participants in business enterprise. Stalceholder theory runs into intractable pliilosophical difficLrlty in providing credible ethical prirrciples for business managers in dealing with some topics, such as the natural environment, tlrat do not directly involve human beings within a business firm ol u,ho engage in transactions u,ith a firm." For rrornrative stakeholder theory lhe lack ol voica also constitLrtes a lack ot.stuncling for the environrnent within the govenrance of corporate affair.s.
The pragnratic approach turrrs on two explicit qitestions: r,r,hat is the iclerrtity of a stal<eholcler and what criteria or attribLrte must be present in order fbr rnanagement to care. As to tl,e first, most thinkers and researcl-ier apply a broad rather than ltarrow definition of stal<eholder that could errcolxpass the natural environnrerrt (LaplLrme et aI.,2008). As to attributes, threellower, legitimacy, and urgency-recur and a minimllr of two appears necessary to ensure managernellt'cares' (Mitchel et aI.,2000) . The natural environrrrent, has legitir-nacy and may have urgency bLrt lacks power, making it a "dependent" or secondary stakeholcler reqr-riring the rvill (and voice) of another to represent it. Driscoll ancl Staril< (2004) Irave nuanced the discr-rssion by suggesting the 'power' of events involving the envilonment warrants a risk-based approach that treats power probabilistically. Their arguments convince that the natural environment deserves managenlent's consideration br"rt do not elevate its status beyond that of secondary stakeho I der.
A second bodlr s1knowledge colrcenls the treatment of properly rights claims b),iudigenous people within national and international courts. One fonn lor such claims is sovereignty or state-based claims to title b), way of legal treat)/ or occlrpatlcy. Cerrerally inefl'ective, these formalistic or critical approaches attempt to deconstruct texts such as treaties done in historical legal contexts in u4-rich the indigenolrs community was the weak partner (Anaya, 2005) . A second, rnore effective strategy, involves claims of violation of human rights (Arraya,2005) . In these, the clairn is tlrat tlie rratural environrrental assists those communities in forming tlieir own identity and lrumanity (Whitt, 200l) We see all things natural as part of Lrs. All the things ori Earth we see as part lrLrr.nan" (Whitt et al., 2001:709) . A synrpathetic interpretation slrggests, echoing the dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas, that the court's recogr,itiorr of the clairn by an indigenous cor11l'l-llll'rity that the environment is integral to their identitl, also sr"rggests the court recognizes, overtly or at least tacitly, the role of nature in that identity. The courl is protectir-rg not just the claimant as injured br"rt aiso the claim to a relationship rvith the natural environment and thus giving standing to natule.
A lirnited intelpretatiorr rl,ould argLre the court has no need to understand lhe coritextual role played by the environment 1'or the community only the evidence that it pla1,5 5r,.1', a role. 
